

EX # 1108

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Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 2 July 1941

2 July: *(Wed) Cloudy*

Mr. ANDO, Chief of Kyoto Prefecture, visited me at 9 A.M., and we had a talk.

At 10 A.M., Imperial Conference was held in the Imperial Palace, and the national policy to cope with the new situation accompanying the outbreak of the Russo-German War was decided.

At 12.20, Finance Minister KAWADA came to my office and explained about the permission for the threefold increase of ~~loan~~ to the WANG Government.
loan of three hundred million yen

At 1 P.M. Prince KONOYE called me at my officeroom, and we talked. He said that he found it difficult to understand the true intention of Foreign Minister MATSUKA.

From 2 to 3 P.M., was received in audience by the Emperor, and was told about the progress of the Imperial Conference. At 3:20 P.M., made arrangements with the chief aide-de-camp for the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters within the Imperial Court and for the Imperial visit to HIYAMA.

At 3:30 P.M. Mr. Sakichi Shimozone came to my office and we had a talk.

At 7:30 P.M. Mr. HISATADA HIROSE visited me and we had a talk.

Q. # 1112

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 July 41"

.....Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace at 2 p.m., and we talked after his withdrawal from the Imperial presence. He said that information of the diplomatic parley between France and Japan relative to the Japanese Army's entry into French Indo-China seemed to have leaked out, for Ambassador CRAIGIE had lodged a protest with us through Mr. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, saying that if the understanding reached between France and Japan were true, England would consider it a serious problem. Therefore the negotiations which had been originally scheduled to start today or thereabout were decided to be postponed for another five days in order to watch necessary developments.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 15 July 41"

MATSUDAIRA came from Tokyo at eight a.m. to report on the outcome of his meeting with Premier KONOYE. There still remained a certain vagueness about Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude towards the proposal formula for a Japan-American understanding. Under the circumstances, up to yesterday the Premier was of the opinion that should the Foreign Minister agree to the formula prepared by the Director of Military Affairs and the Director of Naval Affairs, with a few alterations he would push the policy as it was. Although the Foreign Minister had no objection to the formula, he insisted on giving instructions to Ambassador NOMURA in Washington to the effect that the Government would reject the oral statement of Mr. Cordell Hull, as it was of a disgraceful nature for Japan. After that he said that he would wire a compromise formula to Admiral Kichisaburo NOMURA. But Prince KONOYE was of the opinion that our formula should be wired at the same time, because if we followed MATSUOKA's idea, there would be a possibility that America might take it as our intention to discontinue the negotiations. Adviser SAITO advised that since it could be done by the Ambassador as deemed best, how about carrying it on according to the Foreign Minister's view? But the Premier contradicted him and sent him to Mr. MATSUOKA in order to persuade him to agree with the Premier's opinion. Such was the position about 10:30 yesterday evening. At 1:30 this morning Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that he had waited long for MATSUOKA's answer in vain, so he had sent Director TERAZAKI to Mr. MATSUOKA to hold an enquiry into the circumstances. It became clear that he had sent his instructions to NOMURA by himself and not through the medium of the competent director, and that he intended to call on me at Hayama to work out remedial measures. I had a conference with the chief secretary regarding policy in the event of the expected resignation en bloc of the Cabinet. At this time when the tension prevailing over the people regarding the present political situation was so strong that even some higher schools closed lest disturbances should arise an overall political change for some unknown reason should be avoided by all means. For this purpose we should try everything possible to obtain, first of all, the resignation of the Foreign Minister. In the case of failure of our effort to make the Foreign Minister resign, resulting in the resignation 'en bloc' of the Cabinet, we resolved to prevail upon the Emperor to issue an Imperial command to Prince KONOYE to form a new Cabinet in order to tide over the difficult political situation.

I went to my office at 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 1:35 p.m. to 2 p.m. to report on the above circumstances. Prince KONOYE came to see me from Tokyo at 3 p.m. We had a talk until 4:20 p.m. What I heard from the Premier was almost the same as the information I had received from the Chief Secretary.

I thought it was advisable to urge Mr. MATSUOKA's resignation to avoid a change of Cabinet, but the Premier disagreed with me saying that if this were done Mr. MATSUOKA and his party would make propaganda to the effect that the cause which had compelled his resignation was nothing but pressure on the part of the U.S.A. upon our Government.

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"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 16 July 41"

At 4 p.m. Marquis MATSUDAIRA telephoned me to say that the resignation 'en bloc' of the cabinet had been decided at a special Cabinet meeting. I had my audience with the Emperor from 4:10 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the general resignation of his Ministry at 9 p.m. I proceeded to the Palace in response to a summons from His Majesty to receive an Imperial order as to the incoming Cabinet as follows: "As the Premier has tendered the general resignation of his Ministry, we have ordered the Lord Chamberlain to invite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-Premiers to gather at the Palace and to ask their opinions in order to reply to our question as to who was the suitable person for the post of Premier in the succeeding Cabinet." I talked with the Chief Secretary to arrange tomorrow's procedure and went back home at 10:30 p.m.

Q 1117

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 17 July 41"

I left for Tokyo by train, leaving at 8:44 a.m. and proceeded to my office. I met HARA, President of the Privy Council, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, ABE, YONAI, HAYASHI and HIROTA at 1 p.m. Mr. KANROJI, Vice Lord Chamberlain, delivered an Imperial message, and then I expressed my opinion as follows:

"The Emperor has ordered me to gather your opinions before I make a reply to the Throne regarding the Premier of the succeeding Cabinet. I, therefore, would like to have your frank opinions on this matter as I had on a previous occasion. Of course as you all know this is not a formal conference and no resolutions will be passed, but I should like to have a heart-to-heart talk in a friendly atmosphere. Our utterances in this place are expected to be kept confidential."

A copy of the Premier's resignation was circulated for reference.

WAKATSUKI questioned me as to the purpose of the resignation and the diplomatic problems (i.e. the clash of opinions between the Premier and Foreign Minister). ABE stressed the necessity of having Prince KONOYE as Premier; OKADA recommended Prince KONOYE, saying that no other person could exercise general control over both the Army and political circles; HAYASHI held the same opinion as ABE and OKADA; HARA did not differ from the above-mentioned; HIROTA laid stress upon the reinforcement of G.H.Q. and the formation of a military Cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explanation of the establishment of G.H.Q. YONAI said that Prince KONOYE was the most suitable man to cope with the present difficulty. WAKATSUKI supported Prince KONOYE though his attitude was not positive. We recommended Prince KONOYE unanimously and closed our meeting at 2 p.m. The Emperor and Empress returned to Tokyo from their Hayama Villa. I visited the Emperor from 3:30 p.m. to 4:10 p.m. to report on the progress of our meeting, while the Lord Chamberlain telephoned to Prince KONOYE to request his presence at the Palace. At 5:05 p.m. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace to receive the Imperial command to form a cabinet. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, visited me at 5:50 p.m. to explain the draft understanding between the U.S.A. and this country.

EX # 1134

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"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 Sept 41"

September 5th, 1941 - (Extract)

..... At 4.30 p.m. the Premier proceeded to the Palace and submitted to the Throne a plan relative to the holding of a Council in the Imperial presence. The Premier said that as the Emperor asked many questions as to our policy towards U.S.A. from the point of view of war strategy, he had advised the Emperor to summon the Chief of General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. I, therefore, proceeded to the Palace to advise the Emperor to follow the Premier's advice. I requested Aide-de-camp YOKOYAMA to call the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Premier to the Palace. At 6 p.m. they were granted an audience by the Emperor to answer the Imperial questions.

Ex # 1135

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 6 Sept 41"

September 6th, 1941 - (Extract)

.....From 9.40 to 9.55 a.m. I visited the Emperor in response to the Imperial summons. He said that he would like to ask some questions at the Conference in his presence. Then I advised His Majesty that since HARA, the President of the Privy Council, would ask important questions on His Majesty's behalf, the Emperor should only give a warning in conclusion that the Supreme War Command should exert every effort in order to bring about a diplomatic success inasmuch as the present decision was such an important one that it might lead to a war in which our national fortunes would be staked. I visited the Emperor again from 1.10 p.m. to 1.30 p.m. and he acquainted me with the progress of the ^{Imperial Council} ~~Council in the Imperial presence~~. I understood that the Supreme War Command simply did not answer the questions put by ^{HARA} ~~the President~~ of the Privy Council concerning diplomatic moves. At the close of the meeting, the Emperor declared it was regrettable that the Supreme War Command did not give any reply. Also quoting the Emperor Meiji's poem entitled "The Sea on All Four Sides", His Majesty emphasized that wholehearted efforts should be made in the conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the United States. ^{But} ~~He added~~ that the Navy Minister made an answer to HARA's questions.

Entry from Marquis KIDO'S Diary, 15 Oct 41October 15th, 1941 (Full)

YAKATA visited me at 9 a.m. At 9.30 a.m. Lieut.-General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me to deliver War Minister TOJO's message, the purport of which is as follows: If the Premier would not change his mind, the general resignation of the Cabinet would be unavoidable. And as for the succeeding premier, although the War Minister did not mention his name, he made it essential that the next Premier should be able to bring the Army and the Navy together, and follow the Imperial will. When one considered this point, it seemed very difficult to find a suitable person among ordinary Japanese subjects. He mentioned Prince HIGASHI-KUNI as a possibility for the next Premier. To this I answered that we should be very careful as it was a matter concerned with the Imperial family, and if we had to ask the Prince's acceptance of the premiership, a common policy between the Army and the Navy should be worked out beforehand; the establishment of an independent policy would take precedence of all other questions. I asked if the War Minister had any accurate forecast to make on this point.

I went to the office at 11 a.m. Prince KONOYE visited me to ask my opinion regarding the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet. I answered that it was still under consideration. I requested MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, to study the procedure of the materialisation of the HIGASHIKUNI plan. I visited the Emperor from 1.15 p.m. to 2 p.m. to report upon the pressing political situation. Premier KONOYE visited me at 4 p.m. to say that he could not hold his Premiership any longer, for the breach with the War Minister was becoming wider every day until at last the War Minister gave vent to his discontent saying that he did not like to hold any further conversation with the Premier, as he was not sure if he could stifle his feelings. Finally he asked my opinion regarding the proposed HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet, so I told him that I did not know whether the War Minister had changed his opinion in order to effect a compromise with the Navy or whether he intended to put the Prince's shoulder to the wheel, and I had yet to know the real intentions of the War Minister.

I telephoned to the President of the Planning Board to request him to visit me. I visited the Minister of the Imperial Household Department to talk about the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet plan. The Minister seemed astonished and strongly objected to this plan. At 4.30 p.m. SUZUKI,

President of the Planning Board, visited me. I asked him as to the real meaning of the War Minister's intentions, but in vain. I urged him to supply me with a definite report on this matter. The Premier, who joined our conversation on his withdrawal from the presence of the Emperor, said that the Emperor had not shown any particular objection to the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet as it might be said to be the outcome of necessity, not of choice.

I talked with the Premier until 8.30 p.m. regarding the political situation. At night SUZUKI telephoned to report on the result of his conversation with War Minister TOJO. According to his report, TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of the Prince. So I objected to the plan. The Premier also telephoned me to say that he wanted to secure an informal consent of Prince HIGASHIKUNI. I answered that it would be too early to do so, though I had no objection to him so long as his action was in his capacity as Premier. At midnight the Premier sent me a report saying that Prince HIGASHIKUNI had asked for a few days consideration on his part and a meeting with War Minister and the Home Minister. From 5.35 a.m. to 5.50 a.m. I made a report to the Throne concerning Prince Konoye's talk and asked the Imperial opinion as to the matter.

Ex. # 1151

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIOD's Diary, 16 Oct 41"

At 8:30 a.m. President SUZUKI visited me, and we discussed the Prince's Cabinet. The reasons I gave him for opposing the Prince's Cabinet are as follows:

1. The formation of a Prince's Cabinet should be carried out only when unavoidable, for example, when, even if the Army and Navy agree, force of circumstance makes it necessary to have a Prince of the blood solve their difficulties.

2. The difficulties which were discussed last night have not been solved, and the Prince should not be expected to overcome them.

3. In a way the formation of this Prince's Cabinet would indicate that we lacked a suitable person among our subjects, and a great problem would be created if war with the U.S.A. were to break out when such a Cabinet existed. There were important reasons why even Prince Konoze was prevented from carrying out the policies decided at Councils in the Imperial presence, and if we ask a member of the Imperial House to assume a responsibility he cannot fulfil, it could cause the Imperial House to become an object of public hatred.

At 3:00 p.m. War Minister TOJO called on me to report on the pressing political situation. I opposed his idea of the Prince's Cabinet for the same reasons which I had made clear to SUZUKI. I urged the revision of the resolution of the Council in the Imperial presence, and a unified policy for the Army and the Navy, two fundamental factors without which no national progress could be expected.

At 4 p.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned to say that the Cabinet was going to resign 'en bloc'. I was astonished by the suddenness of this announcement. I visited the Emperor at 4 p.m. to report upon the general resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet. At 5 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the Cabinet Ministers' resignations to the Throne. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. to answer his questions regarding the succeeding Cabinet.

I pointed out that the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on Sept. 6th were rather careless, and I urged ---

Q# 1154
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"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 17 Oct 41"

At 11 a.m. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me to make arrangements for a senior statesmen's conference. It was held from 1:10 p.m. to 3:45 p.m. in the west antechamber of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, General HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, Admiral YONAI, all ex-Premiers and President of the Privy Council HARA. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAKATSUKI recommended General UGAKI as the succeeding Premier, and General HAYASHI discussed the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet.

I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last Council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the Army and Navy. I suggested a TOJO Cabinet as a solution of these problems, with TOJO as Premier and War Minister, even though he is on military service. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, and Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 p.m. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-Premiers Conference and talked with him until 4:15 p.m. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace at the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial Order for the formation of a new Cabinet. This was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave advice to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I passed on to them in an anteroom the following message as ordered by the Emperor. In deciding the fundamental policy of our country we need not necessarily follow the decisions of the Council in the Imperial presence on the 6th of September, but should study carefully conditions both at home and abroad.

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 October

18 October (Saturday)

Cloudy and rainy.

I proceeded to the palace at 9 a.m. and was received in audience by the Emperor at 9:15 to present a memorial to the throne from Prince KANIN, to which the Emperor gave his sanction. The memorial was concerned with War Minister TOJO's remaining on active service and with his promotion to full general.

Went to Yasukuni Shrine at 10 and attended the Imperial worship. Went to my office at 1 p.m. and was at once received in audience to explain the circumstances under which War Minister TOJO is forming a cabinet.

War Minister TOJO was received in audience at 3 and presented the list of his cabinet members.

The Emperor summoned me and inquired about the cabinet members.

The investiture of the new Premier was conducted by the Emperor at 4.

Came home at 5.

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"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 20 Oct 41"

October 20th, 1941

"I received gracious words from His Majesty on account of my efforts in connection with the cabinet change. I was truly moved.

"I told His Majesty that one mistaken step taken in the present cabinet change might have inadvertently plunged us into war. After careful consideration I believe this to be the only way of giving a new turn to the situation and had thus recommended it. His Majesty understood me well replying 'As it is said you know, -- 'He who will not go into the tiger's den will not get the tiger cub.'

"I was impressed."

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"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 13 Oct 41"

October 13th, 1941 (Extract)

.....SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me at 8 p.m. to talk about his political views which might contribute in some way to the making of a new turn in our political condition. I expressed my opinion to him. Our conclusion of the talk was this: The Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's
Diary, 29 November 1941"

From 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. the Emperor asked Senior Statesmen's opinions concerning the present political situation.

The Emperor remarked on the difficult times we were going through.

Baron WAKATSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the U.S.A. in spiritual power, but regarding material power we must make a careful study.

Admiral OKADA said that he had grave doubts as to our supply capacity in regard to war materials, and thought the Government's statement about this matter to date was quite incomplete.

Baron HIRANUMA agreed with Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion as regards the spiritual strength of the Japanese nation, and urged further measures to awaken patriotic sentiment.

Prince KONOYE stated that it was quite regrettable that our negotiations were going to be a failure in spite of our strenuous efforts since last April. But he was of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just because of the rupture of the negotiations as we might be able to reach a wise solution in some way or other, while continuing our struggle against difficulties.

Admiral YONAI said that he could not base his opinion on definite data, but it was his desire that we should be careful not to lose what little we possess by trying to avoid becoming poorer by inches.

Mr. HIROTA said that although our policy had been to prevent Anglo-American interference in the China Incident, things had reached their present situation. We should be able to seize an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two countries even after the commencement of hostilities, if we were sincere enough in our diplomatic efforts.

General HAYASHI stated that as he had no data for his opinion, he could do nothing but believe the decisions of the Imperial Headquarters and the Government.

General ABE said that according to the Government statement the negotiations had come to a deadlock in spite of strenuous efforts on our part. He was sure that the Government had studied the world political situation from various angles with laborious minuteness, for which we were thankful. But it would be quite necessary to pay much more attention to the attitude of the Chinese people than to the war with the U.S.A., otherwise we would lose the fruits of victory in the Chinese Incident.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the war should be fought to the last, even if there was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for the cause of our national existence and self-defence, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realise our ideals such as "the Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere" or "the stabilising of power in Asia", because such a war would be very dangerous.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's
Diary, 30 November 1941"

I visited the Emperor at 3.30 p.m. in response to his request. He said that Prince TAKAMATSU had told him that the Navy's hands were full and it appeared that he wished to avoid war, but did not know what to do. I advised the Emperor to ask the opinions of the Navy Minister, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Premier, for the situation was really grave. We could not be too prudent in the matter. At 6.35 p.m. I again visited the Emperor in response to his request. He said that he had ordered the Premier to act according to program on account of the affirmative answers of the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff concerning the question as to the success of the war.